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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00794-87/1
20 February 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Frederick L. Wetters
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 17 February 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

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for Frederick L. Wetters

Attachment:
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17 February 1987

WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics at our monthly warning meeting on 17 February.

2. Brief Items:

(1) Somalia--Political and Military Update. CIA led the discussion which concluded that:

- [redacted] has confirmed a recent border incursion in northern Somalia. Ethiopian troops penetrated about one kilometer inside Somalia, [redacted] about 80 Ethiopian bodies and several tank hulls. Deeper penetrations into Somalia probably were by SNM insurgents alone. The Ethiopian incursion probably was intended as retaliation for recent Somali raids on SNM camps near the border and to cover the SNM attacks. The fighting is likely to wind down now, as it did after similar clashes in the past.
- In Mogadishu, ethnic Marehans probably have made some recent political gains at President Siad's expense. Most significantly, Hashi Ganni--the senior Marehan general in the Army--is now a Third Minister of Defense. Ali Samantar has been named Prime Minister--probably another step in grooming him to succeed Siad--but Siad himself took over the Defense portfolio. Whether or not the next Minister of Defense will be a Samantar booster is a key question.
- The anti-Samantar clique of Marehan officers and politicians includes several who are antagonistic to the United States such as Foreign Minister Jama Barre, General Ganni, and Colonel Abduweli.

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Warning Note: Somali officials who oppose Samantar increasingly appear to be anti-US as well. The US aid reductions add to Somali disappointment with the United States, and the recent border clashes could contribute to a Somali perception that US help is needed but not forthcoming. Samantar was at least embarrassed by the US aid cuts, and his decision not to make a scheduled visit to the United States probably was intended to signal his displeasure.

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(2) Zaire--Another Mobutu Visit. President Mobutu is scheduled to be in Washington 21-25 February on unofficial business. He is arriving from Brazil, apparently having cancelled a stop in Mexico to come to the United States. In Washington, he is to meet with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, some Congressmen, and several bankers. DIA took the lead on this discussion, which agreed that:

- Mobutu's last visit in late 1986 went well, although he got no agreement on his problems with the IMF and his request for additional US military aid. Mobutu's recent cabinet changes (including replacing the Prime Minister) reflect his determination to take personal charge of IMF matters. He has announced various new proposals at variance with IMF guidelines.
- Mobutu may raise several issues on this trip. First, he may repeat his offer to allow the United States to use Kamina and Kitona airbases; the US Air Force wants to do so, but US inspectors estimate repairs needed for long-term continued use will cost \$114.5 million. Secondly, he undoubtedly will raise his problems with the IMF; Mobutu wants to cooperate and compromise, and the IMF is somewhat sympathetic, but Zaire's economic problems are daunting. Third, Chad may come up; Mobutu has offered to train another Chadian government battalion in Zaire and may ask the United States to provide the necessary unit equipment.

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(3) Chad--Military and Political Update. DIA began the discussion. There was consensus that:

- Libya continues to reinforce and now has 11,000 or 12,000 troops in Chad. [redacted] says Libya's goal is to have 14,000 troops in Chad. They are busy laying defensive minefields and continuing reconnaissance and other air activity. The reinforcing and strengthening of defenses has delayed Libya's expected offensive.

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- Libya's reinforcements demonstrate firm resolve and probably are intended in part as a signal to France. Paris has responded with its own signal, sending about 900 more French troops to take up defensive positions between N'Djamena and the 16th Parallel.
- Libya's reinforcements and defensive precautions have delayed its next offensive, but the Libyans probably will be ready for an attack on Fada in two weeks or so. Habre also has delayed offensive action in order to protect Fada; he has about 7,000 troops in that general area now. DIA suggested that France must respond to Libyan airstrikes south of the 16th Parallel last weekend or lose its stare-down with Libya, but INR speculated that France need do nothing because the airstrikes avoided French targets. Moreover, they may not be seen as provocative if they were in reaction to recently reported attacks by Habre's guerrillas on Libyan targets in the Aozou Strip. The French signal to Libya in sending an additional 900 troops to southern Chad has not inhibited Libyan actions. NIO/AF noted that Qadhafi has trumped the French move by the continuing Libyan buildup, the recent bombing south of the 16th Parallel, and the heavy-handed surveillance of French facilities in West Africa by Libyan operatives (implying casing for a terrorist action).
- Negotiation activity continues apace, with Goukouni now in Algiers suggesting talks with Habre. Serious talks between Libya and Habre are unlikely at least until after the expected battle for Fada, however, and prospects for a settlement are dim. Libya is unlikely to withdraw or to recognize Habre, and these are Habre's core demands.

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Warning Note: The odds are greater than 50-50 that Habre's troops will lose Fada to the much larger Libyan attacking force, despite expected Libyan problems controlling such large forces. That will not necessarily be a major setback for the Chadians, however, unless they suffer heavy casualties. Habre has seriously increased his risks in his northern Chad campaign. The bulk of Habre's army is at Fada, from which withdrawal under fire might prove extremely difficult. The French probably will not do anything to help Habre hold Fada, at least not before the battle begins.

(4) Sierra Leone--Growing Domestic Pressures. CIA led the discussion, which concluded that:

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- Sierra Leone's economic and political problems continue to mount. More than 1,500 students recently engaged in protest demonstrations and all three universities in the country are closed. Shops are closed in Freetown, and students have looted rice warehouses and burned the ruling party headquarters. Inflation is rampant and the government is nearly bankrupt--about 50 percent of all coffee exports are smuggled out of Sierre Leone, and Freetown cannot pay for petroleum imports.
- Corruption has reached President Momoh and his wife. Momoh's recent acquisition of a \$2-million house may have been partly responsible for sparking the student demonstrations. Moreover, the PLO recently gained permission to establish an embassy in Freetown by paying for it.
- The armed forces are a powerful power broker, but it is not yet apparent that the military will move against Momoh. Senior officers clearly are unhappy with the President, and Force Commander Tarawallie is losing confidence in him. Tarawallie probably will not mount a coup, however, in part because he may not want to be President amid such chaos. Lesser officers have been bought off for the present with government-subsidized rice, but rice shortages are increasing.

Warning Note: Increasing unrest, probably led by students and perhaps joined by their parents, is likely. Food and petroleum shortages will worsen, and Momoh probably will remain indecisive, weak, and confused about economic matters. He is likely to do whatever he can think of to alleviate the problems, and will try to beg or borrow the money to pay for fuel imports, paying whatever foreign policy price is required. Force Commander Tarawallie probably will not attempt a coup, but dissatisfaction among lesser officers is likely to become actual plotting. Tarawallie could be provoked into leading a preemptive coup, however, if he sees others about to take action.

3. Main Item:

Sudan's Southern Insurgency: Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement. A CIA analyst introduced this topic by summarizing his just-completed paper on the subject. There was consensus on the key judgments that:

- Neither the government forces nor the southern insurgents appear capable of seriously hurting the other side.

speculated that there will be much indecisive fighting ahead followed by some eventual negotiated outcome. Neither Sadiq nor Garange is likely to discard the military option, however, in part because neither leader faces a

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serious internal challenge over continued prosecution of the war.

Although there is factionalism on both sides, disagreements focus on other issues.

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- Neither the government nor the insurgents has any incentive to negotiate. The insurgent SPLM has no faith that any government in Khartoum--let alone Sadiq's--would meet its demand to improve the lot of southerners, and the SPLM is adamant that Islamic law must be abolished. Sadiq is unwilling to meet either demand because he thinks that would be tantamount to political suicide.
- External actors are likely to continue their present policies. Ethiopia will continue to back the SPLM, the USSR to follow its "hands off" policy toward Sadiq's government, and Egypt to remain immobilized by perceived disadvantages from supporting either side. Cairo wants the war to end so that work can resume on building a canal in southern Sudan that will bring more water to Egypt, but Cairo cannot be certain that the SPLM would permit the canal project to proceed if it were left in control of the area.
- The situation might change if possible developments were to increase the pressure on Sadiq or Garang to talk. Sadiq's soldiers in the south might mutiny and force him to sue for peace; government bureaucrats might join the student demonstrations and press for change, or the burgeoning refugee population in Khartoum might get out of hand. On the SPLM's side, factionalism might grow as a result of growing casualties or logistic shortfalls and pressure Garang to change his policies. These developments are unlikely in the short term.

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Warning Note: High-level government over-confidence could lead to a rash move. Khartoum, for example, might try a risky offensive in the south, such as an attack on SPLA headquarters at Boma. Or it might try its "northern card"--stimulating aid to anti-Ethiopian rebels as a counter to Addis Ababa's backing of the Sudanese insurgents--which could backfire with serious consequences.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

Office of the Vice President
DIA/DIO/Africa
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8
Army/OACSI
Army/ITAC
Air Force
State/INR
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/CRES
DDI/OGI
DDI/LDA
DDI/NESA
DDI/OIA
NPIC
DDO/AF
ICS/OHC

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